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The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
Regulatory dialogue between states with widely diverging tax systems has emerged as a 
key feature of OECD, IMF and EU initiatives on Offshore Finance Centres or Tax Havens. 
This has brought together states of differing dimensions in size, population, economy and 
power. Where there is such a discrepancy in power between states there is often a 
temptation to assert a command and control regulatory approach. This was the initial 
reading of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Project that identified 35 tax havens - small 
states in Europe, the Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Caribbean - and demanded that they 
repeal financial secrecy legislation and commit to exchange of information agreements. As 
these initiatives have unfolded there has been a transition away from regulation by 
command and control towards responsive regulatory dialogue in which tax havens have 
been encouraged to cooperate through engagement and active participation. Based on 
qualitative research with key stakeholders in OFC jurisdictions and multilateral 
organisations, this paper explores this transition. It argues that the preservation of tax 
bilateralism has limited the capacity of multilateral organisations to deploy the full range 
of regulatory techniques, particularly those involving penalty and coercion. Instead all 
parties, tax haven states and multilateral institutions, have been confined to the broadest 
base of the regulatory pyramid. It suggests that while responsive regulation and meta 
regulatory principles may not provide ‘quick-fix’ solutions to international tax avoidance, 
they may offer more enduring policies to manage the sovereign states that seek to legislate 
for offshore ‘loopholes’. 
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Responsive regulation, multilateralism, bilateral tax treaties and the continuing 
appeal of offshore finance centres 
 
Gregory Rawlings 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2003 Marc Forme, the Prime Minister of Andorra, commenting on the European 
Commission’s (EC) Savings Tax Directive, observed that … ‘The whole thing does not 
end with Andorra, Monaco or Liechtenstein. I would like to know what other countries like 
the United States, Singapore and Taiwan think about the fiscal directive on savings, 
because money is volatile and if in the end Europe applies the directive it will see capital 
flee to these other countries’ (Forme, cited in Lomas, 2003, emphasis added).  
 
The Prime Minister was pointing to the fact that while financiers may use global circuits 
for transnational business transactions they still follow bilateral routes, moving from 
country to country in the pursuit of the most advantageous conditions for tax-free 
investment. The mobility of capital is bound by few multilateral agreements, but is rather 
liberated by the multiple bilateral policies and conditions set by national governments and 
their tax systems.  
 
Since 1990, Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs), more commonly known as tax havens such 
as Andorra, have come under pressure to abolish excessive bank secrecy and implement 
exchange of information agreements with countries that believe their tax revenues are 
being undermined by offshore products and services. Tax orientated initiatives pursued by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European 
Union (EU) are paralleled by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the former concerned with money laundering, the 
latter with the systemic risk that poorly regulated OFCs pose to the world’s financial 
markets.  
 
This article is concerned with three multilateral initiatives in offshore finance: the OECD’s 
Harmful Tax Practices Project, the EU’s Savings Tax Directive and the IMF’s offshore 
finance assessment program. These initiatives have brought together states of widely 
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differing dimensions in size, population, economy and power. Where there is such 
asymmetry between states there is often a temptation to assert a command and control 
regulatory approach. As these initiatives have unfolded however, there has been a 
transition away from regulation by control and command towards responsive regulatory 
dialogue in which OFC states have been encouraged to cooperate through engagement and 
participation.  
 
After discussing its qualitative methodology and reviewing these international initiatives in 
taxation, this paper covers three main areas. First it suggests that it is erroneous to consider 
tax haven states as completely unregulated financial spaces. They are regulated but in an 
asymmetrical alignment to the regulations of OECD countries. Second, these initiatives 
have moved away from a command and control approach to responsive regulation because 
a number of key actors, namely the OECD and the EU, lack the enforcement capacities at a 
multilateral level to ensure compliance if persuasion and cooperation fail. These initiatives 
have become confined to the broadest base of the regulatory pyramid. Third, this paper 
discusses the way tax haven states have made commitments through Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) rather than legally enforceable treaties. Due to the international 
public law principle of estoppel, this makes the enforceability of these commitments even 
more doubtful. Consequently what started out as multilateral initiatives designed to reduce 
falling tax revenues in OECD and EU countries, has ended up reinforcing the bilateral 
system of double taxation treaties, which have become a model for exchange of 
information agreements. This reinvigorated bilateralism has enhanced the sovereignty of 
many of these OFC states, leading to their continued appeal as locales from which to 
organise low tax multinational business ventures.  
 
This article argues that through allowing OFCs to demonstrate their good governance to 
the world they maintain their client base and sustain an on-going fiscal competition 
between states for tax revenues. They build upon existing bilateralism in international 
taxation and the diffuse and fragmented character of international capitalism (Braithwaite 
& Drahos, 2000, pp. 97-99 & 108-114; Palan, 2003, pp. 181-191). This article concludes 
by suggesting that responsive regulation and metaregulation of the offshore has the best 
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chance for success if it moves away from a continued reliance on fiscal bilateralism and 
towards truly multilateral tax principles.  
 
Methodology 
 
This paper is partly based on interviews with 48 accountants, lawyers, regulators, fund 
managers, insurers, CEOs, legislators and fiduciaries in Australia, Andorra, Guernsey, 
France, Samoa and Singapore in a series of research trips between December 2002 and 
October 2004. Most research participants were either lawyers or accountants. Interviews 
were semi-structured and open-ended, allowing interlocutors to raise issues that were 
meaningful and relevant to them. These interviews canvassed the effects of multilateral 
initiatives to regulate OFCs, changes in client profile and market response, motivations for 
using offshore structures and cross-border tax planning techniques.  
 
McCahery and Picciotto (1995) show that the specialised knowledge of professionals, 
particularly lawyers, allows them to mediate the abstract domain of formal rules on the one 
hand and the financial aspirations of their clients on the other. They are able to interpret 
unclear laws and take advantage of regulatory diversity that characterises OFC states and 
national tax regimes for wealthy individuals and corporate clients. Through the practice of 
lawyering (and this can be extended to cognate professions such as accountancy), rules and 
regulations can be transformed by a process of ‘indeterminacy’, taking advantage of legal 
ambiguity (McCahery & Picciotto, 1995, p. 244). This is crucial in understanding 
multilateral initiatives aimed at curtailing tax haven use. The principles (such as 
transparency) and rules (for instance, that records must be maintained to an acceptable 
standard) devised by multilateral organisations and offshore financial authorities are 
subject to divergent interpretations between regulators and regulatees. It is social actors – 
lawyers, accountants, fund managers, tax compliance regulators – who frame these 
contests, through their daily deeds and narrated reflections on their practices.  
 
Methodologically, this paper emphasises the narratives that a cross-section of stakeholders 
involved in the offshore sector articulate. It is concerned with the stories they tell. These 
actors are in an ideal position to comment on the offshore, because their practices and 
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social networks make macro structures possible. It allows the micro to be reconciled with 
the macro. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 14) affirm:  
 
The methodological prescription is to gather data on the most macro phenomena 
possible from the most micro source possible – individuals, especially individuals 
who act as agents for larger collectivities.  
 
These agents report that the offshore has embraced regulatory strategies that are both 
responsive in character and meta in implementation. This has not however, damaged their 
industry. Rather it has enhanced both offshore finance and offshore statecraft alike.  
 
Offshore Finance Centres and multilateral initiatives: A review 
 
In 1998 the OECD released a report arguing that OFCs encourage tax evasion, facilitate 
questionable aggressive tax planning strategies, undermine revenue raising systems in 
member and non-member countries alike, and distort global investment decisions. The 
OECD identified 12 key features of ‘harmful preferential tax regimes’ (OECD, 1998,       
p. 33). The report noted that the existence of bank secrecy ‘may constitute one of the most 
harmful characteristics of a regime. The availability of protection from enquiries by tax 
authorities is one of the biggest attractions of many harmful regimes’ (OECD, 1998, p. 33). 
The OECD urged jurisdictions to abolish such laws in the interests of international tax 
cooperation and information sharing. If they did not commit to ending harmful tax 
practices then these countries would face ‘defensive measures’ or financial sanctions.  
 
Authorities in the listed jurisdictions expressed concern that this would lock them out of 
the world’s financial system through placing restrictions on inward/outward bound 
payments and transactions. They argued that the OECD’s initiatives were an infringement 
of sovereignty, took advantage of their relative vulnerability as small states, would 
undermine their economies and offered no alternative development strategies or financial 
compensation in the wake of lost revenue upon abandoning their financial services 
industries.  
 5
The leaders of the 35 jurisdictions1, along with regulators and fund managers located in 
these territories, also argued that the OECD’s initiatives would unfairly restrict competition 
in financial services that would benefit OECD members, particularly those with active ‘on-
shore off-shores’ located in the UK, USA, Japan and Ireland. The OECD was accused of 
unwarranted intervention in the ‘most jealousy guarded aspect of national sovereignty’ of 
all: taxation (Picciotto, 1999, p. 70). Owen Arthur the Prime Minister of Barbados, 
described the OECD as ‘institutional imperialists’ and the proposals as ‘tyrannical’ 
(Hetherington-Gore, 2000). Prominent politicians on the Isle of Man threatened a unilateral 
declaration of independence in response to the OECD initiative (O’Sullivan, 1999). The 
Premier of the South Pacific island nation of Niue, Sani Lakatani, asked rhetorically ‘what 
about Switzerland … Luxembourg … and the US state of Delaware?’ (Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, 2001). The Premier was alluding to the fact that Switzerland 
and Luxembourg, both leading world finance centres and prominent members of the 
OECD, refused to endorse the organisation proposals and avoided inclusion on the list of 
tax havens.  
 
Despite this initial opposition, the OECD and 30 of the listed tax havens entered into 
dialogue over these proposals, leading to a series of global and regional fora and meetings 
with OECD officials and offshore regulators between 2000 and 2004. They are now 
engaged in on-going talks to establish common principles of transparency, and standards 
for exchange of information. The OECD has moved away from a command and control 
regulatory style to one involving dialogue, with prospects for coercion moved into the 
background.  
 
The OECD was joined by the European Union in 2001 when it announced plans to 
standardise the cross-border taxation of non-resident interest payments to individuals with 
bank accounts and other interest bearing investments within the EU (Commission of the 
                                                           
1 These are as follows (by geographical area): Pacific Ocean - Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. Europe - Andorra, Gibraltar, Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Liechtenstein and Monaco. Caribbean - Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Aruba, Bahamas, British 
Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands and the US Virgin Islands. Central America - Belize 
and Panama. Indian Ocean - Maldives and Seychelles. Africa – Liberia. Middle East -Bahrain (OECD, 2000).  
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European Communities, 2001, p. 1). In 2003 the European Commission issued the EU 
Savings Tax Directive (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). This was to be 
applied within the EU from 1 January 2005. However, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg 
objected to its exchange of information requirements and succeeded in modifying the 
directive. They have been permitted to levy a withholding tax on non-resident accounts in 
lieu of releasing client information and/or will offer account holders the option of 
withholding tax or exchanging information (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Luxembourg, 
2003). This option of exchanging information with EU member states or levelling a 
withholding tax on interest income was then extended to non-EU member states 
(Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, the British Overseas 
Territories and the Crown Dependencies of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man) in an 
effort to encourage their cooperation with the directive. These non-member states (with the 
possible exception of the British Overseas Territories) are under no obligation to 
implement EU directives, but it would be limited in its efficacy if it were confined to EU 
member states, as residents of the EU could shift their money outside of the Union. 
However, the EU has limited its negotiations to only a small number of non-member 
jurisdictions. It does not apply to independent Caribbean, Pacific or South East Asian 
OFCs.  
 
Because offshore banking had been implicated in currency and financial crises in Latin 
America in 1994 and South East Asia in 1997, the IMF has become concerned that OFCs, 
as conduits for poorly supervised speculative transactions, have the capacity to destabilise 
financial markets on a global scale (Erico & Musalem, 1999). They carried the risk of 
‘contagion’, the so-called ‘tequila effect’, where runs on offshore establishments used as 
investment vehicles into emerging markets lead to rapid financial collapses across markets. 
Since 2000 the IMF has been making detailed assessments of financial regulation and 
supervision. It assesses OFC regulation according to international best practice standards 
such as the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Where there are 
deficiencies, the IMF suggests a course of action designed to remedy these. The IMF is 
interested in capacity building, and concentrates on financial risk and Anti Money 
Laundering (AML) policies, rather than tax minimisation. Most of its reports are welcomed 
by OFCs as they usually assert that their regulatory systems are sound or could be 
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improved. For example, following its assessment of Guernsey’s financial sector, the States 
of Guernsey Advisory and Finance Committee and the Guernsey Financial Services 
Commission (2003) issued a joint statement affirming: 
 
Guernsey’s financial regulation and law enforcement standards are commended in a 
report published today by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) … All of these 
standards have been adopted by Guernsey as the foundations on which to build its 
reputation as a leading finance centre.  
 
All these three initiatives have brought powerful states and multilateral institutions into 
negotiations with small OFC states. As one regulator from an OECD country remarked in 
an interview with the author in Paris in February 2004:  
 
At least once a year governments of places where you’d normally think 
‘where is that?’ basically get to sit down with the large economies and 
discuss issues that are relevant including tax legislation. At least they get the 
attention of people they normally wouldn’t get the attention of. This has two 
advantages for them. For one they are at the table with the largest, most 
developed countries. Second, they are inside the process and they can 
influence it. 
 
The transition away from enforcement to a management regulatory approach, whereby the 
‘largest most developed economies’ have moved from attempting to dictate policy to small 
OFC states to incorporating them into policy formulation has been a key characteristic of 
OECD efforts in offshore tax regulation. The EU has taken a similar approach. The IMF 
has gone even further, and arguably augmented the market position of key OFCs, through 
its collaborative capacity building assessments of offshore regulatory regimes. The 
explanation for this transition does not necessarily lie in either OFC opposition or a 
decision by multilateral organisations to be more conciliatory in their approach. Rather, 
enforcing uniform fiscal standards at the top of the regulatory pyramid in a global system 
of bilateral tax treaties is fraught with difficulties. It has made regulation by persuasion and 
cooperation at the base of the regulatory pyramid vital.  
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Regulating responsively offshore 
 
Regulation is not homogenous. Instead there are competing regulatory orders, nodes of 
governance that Shearing and Wood (2003) have identified, intersecting at vital moments. 
They also diverge. The regulatory agenda of the OECD, the Australian Taxation Office 
(Tax Office) or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is likely to diverge from the regulatory 
agenda of a financial services’ authority located in an OFC state. The offshore financial 
services authority is mandated to provide a ‘tax neutral’ (no or minimal taxes) regulatory 
environment that is conducive for business. The national revenue authority is 
commissioned to collect correct amounts of taxation, while multilateral organisations act as 
a forum to facilitate regulatory coordination between national revenue systems. These are 
divergent regulatory interests, reflecting multiplicity at national (the revenue authority and 
the offshore financial services regulator) and supranational (the multilateral organisation) 
levels. There may be points of convergence between these competing regulatory agendas. 
For example, all might agree that transparency is important. It is at these points of 
convergence that collaborative strategies of regulation can be devised. It is these 
intersections of interest that give the best opportunity for building responsive regulation.  
 
Sensationalist media accounts of tax havens usually imply that they are forms of 
unregulated fiscal space permitting almost any form of financial dealing imaginable. By 
implication they are centres of hot money, which is transmitted and remitted across and 
through their porous borders with no regulatory oversight. Industry stakeholders in leading 
OFC states disagree with these assessments. One interviewee on Guernsey, commenting on 
the OECD initiative remarked: 
 
Initially some thought that we were some sort of cowboys who came from Texas, 
but they soon discovered that we are as professional as anywhere else in the world 
(Author interview, Guernsey, January 2004).  
 
OFCs could not successfully operate if they were completely unregulated as more 
sensationalist reports imply. For example the decision by the British government to turn 
Vanuatu, then the New Hebrides, into a tax haven in 1971-1973 was not evidence of 
deregulation, but rather regulation. From 1906-1970 there were no banking regulations in 
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the New Hebrides. When investors started noticing the potential of the New Hebrides as a 
tax haven in the 1960s there were few regulations of any kind controlling business activity 
over and above the British Companies Act of 1948. Banks could be incorporated under this 
act even though it was never designed for that purpose. It was the lack of regulation in the 
New Hebrides that encouraged the British colonial authorities to pass legislation to convert 
the territory’s tax free status into an OFC (Rawlings, 2004, p. 30).  
 
OFC states therefore are regulated. Their regulations may be at variance with OECD states 
and they maybe minimal, but they do provide for security of contract and for the protection 
of property. Andorra for example, has bank reserve requirements to guarantee deposits 
(IMF, 2002). Guernsey has a comprehensive system of trust regulation (the only formal 
regulation of trusts anywhere in the world over and above common law provisions of 
equity and property), while Jersey has an income tax rate of 20 percent. It is thus a 
misnomer to suggest that all OFC states represent unregulated or poorly regulated spaces. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, pp. 9-11) demonstrate that many claims of wholesale 
deregulation are overstated because it is accompanied by the formation of regulatory 
agencies to monitor and supervise new entities that emerge in the wake of privatisation or 
deregulation.  
 
When a government decides to take an existing state of fiscal affairs (for instance, no or 
low taxation) and enacts legislation to provide for an OFC, this is enhanced by the 
formation of a regulatory authority to supervise transnational business. Leading OFC 
states, namely the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands (BVI), Bermuda, Jersey, 
Guernsey, and the Isle of Man have followed this pattern. It has also been the case with 
more specialised private banking centres such as Andorra or niche service providers such 
as Samoa. By contrast, OFC states that have not been able to effectively supervise offshore 
business have not been successful. For example Tonga, which had a complete suite of 
offshore legislation in 2000, did not have effective regulatory capacities to monitor 
offshore business. The fact that the few ships flying the Tongan flag outside the Pacific 
were found to be gun-running for the Palestinians further undermined the reputation and 
viability of the kingdom’s OFC. After the OECD published its list of Tax Havens in 2000, 
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Tonga went further than any other listed jurisdiction and closed down its offshore facilities 
altogether.  
 
Responsive regulation in the absence of deterrence 
 
In leading OFC states the responsibility for regulation lies with local financial service 
authorities. Responsive regulation emphasises voluntary compliance through persuasion 
and cooperation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, pp. 4-5). It takes into account the 
motivations, problems and conditions of the regulated. Assistance and capacity building 
are promoted. Threats are de-emphasised. Sanctions should be available and imposable, 
escalating in ever increasing intensity with recalcitrant non-compliance (Job & Honaker, 
2003, p. 113).  
 
Principles of responsive regulation are evident in relations between states. This is most 
notable within the EU. Individual states have transferred aspects of sovereignty to 
supranational entities (the EC and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) making responsive 
regulation between states possible and effective. It is the supranational EC and ECJ rather 
than individual member states that have regulatory authority. Tallberg (2002) demonstrates 
empirically through an analysis of Commission directives, that rule compliance within the 
EU involves both management (persuasion, negotiation and capacity building) and 
enforcement (the prosecution of states through the ECJ and the imposition of fines and 
other financial penalties for non-compliance). However, this capacity to deploy the full 
range of regulatory techniques is not readily available outside the EU, because of state 
reluctance to transfer sovereignty for effective rule supervision. While Tallberg has 
evidence for the efficacy of a combined management and enforcement strategy, he 
cautions that ‘What is particular about the EU in this comparative perspective is its 
supranational organisation of enforcement and management’ (Tallberg, 2002, p. 639).  
 
However, the EC cannot enforce its directives outside the EU. As a multilateral institution, 
the OECD does not possess powers equivalent to either the EU or the UN Security 
Council. In its 2000 report on harmful tax practices, the OECD listed a number of 
defensive measures or sanctions that could be taken against non-compliant OFC states 
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(OECD, 2000, p. 35). These were fiscal and focused on disallowing tax deductions and 
levelling withholding taxes on remittances to and from OFC states. They were 
proportionate to the amount of revenue that OECD states felt they were losing to OFC 
states. The OECD argued that these defensive measures should be coordinated because 
bilateral or unilateral measures would be limited given ‘a problem that is inherently global 
in nature’ (OECD, 2001, p. 13). However, while the OECD could propose these 
coordinated defensive measures, it had no power to enforce them. This has given OFC 
states considerable leverage in their negotiations. It has also made responsive regulation 
more salient, partly because command and control regulatory policies are not available to 
these multilateral and supranational organisations in their dealings with tax havens. This is 
particularly clear in the way OFC states have been able to ‘comply’ with these initiatives. 
 
Compliance by press release and preclusion by estoppel 
 
Listed jurisdictions could make a commitment to the OECD’s harmful tax practices project 
by way of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) using a press release or a public letter. 
This included a time-line on commitments to transparency, information exchange, the 
abolition of ring fencing 2 and refraining from introducing additional harmful tax 
measures. While commitment by MOU signalled an intention of compliance it was not 
legally binding like a treaty. Gilmore (2002, p. 555) shows that this has significance for 
public international law. He suggests that agreement between states using an MOU can 
have legal consequences given the public international law principle of estoppel. That is if 
state A signals an intention of commitment to state B and state B relies on it (and relies on 
it to its detriment if state A reneges on its commitment) then state A is precluded, or 
estopped, from rescinding its obligation. However, estoppel is only relevant in bilateral 
relations between states. Gilmore (2002, p. 555) points out that the legal position of the 
listed OFC states and their MOU commitments is unclear given that the OECD initiative is 
                                                           
2 Ring fencing is where domestic companies are taxed at a different rate to offshore companies that might not 
be taxed at all. This may include differences between local companies that carry out business in a jurisdiction 
and are taxed on profits and International Business Companies (IBCs) that conduct offshore business and are 
not taxed on any profits. However, this practice is not restricted to OFC states, but is evident in almost all 
OECD members as well. For example Australia has an Offshore Banking Regime that taxes non-residents at 
a lower rate than residents, New Zealand has a category of tax exempt non-resident trust and the United 
Kingdom does not tax non-resident bond income traded on the London money markets.  
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multilateral and that it initially emphasised participation by the OECD as an organisation 
rather than its member states.  
 
Compliance by MOU also assumes that there is a set international standard for cooperation 
in civil and criminal matters. There is not. There is variation within the OECD itself. For 
example the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital circumscribes 
cooperation between member states. A state can refuse to exchange information on the 
basis that there is a lack of reciprocity3, if the risk of disclosure would jeopardise business 
secrets and if disclosure is contrary to public policy (Gilmore, 2002, p. 559). The OFC 
states, through their MOUs, are asked to go beyond the existing minimum standards that 
apply to and between OECD states themselves. The listed jurisdictions argued that this was 
unfair because there was no level playing field between themselves and the OECD. They 
were asked to implement policies that OECD countries, notably Switzerland and 
Luxembourg, were not committed to. Most interviewees emphasised that a level playing 
field was fundamental, and MOU commitments were ultimately contingent on its 
materialisation. One interviewee on Guernsey said that a level playing field was 
‘absolutely vital’ (Interview, Guernsey, 18 December 2003). Another added ‘we have 
insisted throughout our negotiations that we won’t implement these commitments if the 
OECD members don’t do so themselves. These larger countries do not enforce the laws 
that they have sought to impose on other countries such as ourselves’. (Interview, 
Guernsey, January 2004).  
 
This provision was made explicit in some of the commitment MOUs. For example, in 
2002, the commitment from Anguilla stated that the British territory ‘considers the 
establishment of a level playing field among all OECD countries and also those non-
member jurisdictions with which it is materially in competition in the provision of cross-
border financial services to be essential’ (Banks, 2002, p. 2). The lack of a level playing 
field globally has been a major impediment to implementing the commitments in the 
MOUs. One interviewee, noting this, remarked that ‘the concept of a global level playing 
field will take a long time, if ever, to achieve’. In the absence of a level playing field ‘there 
                                                           
3 See Braithwaite & Drahos (2000, pp. 20-23) on the principle of reciprocity.  
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are still a lot of opportunities’ for finance centres such as Guernsey to take advantage of 
(Interview, Guernsey, 18 December 2003). Gilmore (2002) suggests that the commitment 
to the OECD sets a framework within which dialogue can take place. He states that 
commitment by MOU can “more appropriately be described as reflecting either standards 
of an evolving or aspirational nature of perceived ‘best practice’” (Gilmore, 2002, p. 560). 
 
With limited multilateral enforcement capacities the OECD and the jurisdictions have now 
established a framework whereby bilateral exchange of information treaties can be 
negotiated and ratified between individual and OFC and OECD states. Vanuatu was one of 
the last jurisdictions to commit by MOU. In its letter to the OECD on 7 May 2003, 
Vanuatu’s Finance Minister, Sela Molissa, affirmed ‘Such exchanges shall be achieved 
under bilaterally negotiated tax information exchange agreements that require the effective 
exchange of information on specific tax matters pursuant to a specific request’ (Molissa, 
2003).  
 
Hence what started out as multilateral initiatives have unfolded in such a way as to 
reinforce bilateralism in international tax relations. The OECD (2002, p. 2, emphasis 
added) model agreement on Exchange of Information on tax matters affirms that: 
 
The agreement is presented both as a multilateral instrument and a model for 
bilateral treaties or agreements. The multilateral agreement is not a ‘multilateral’ 
agreement in the traditional sense. Instead, it provides a basis for an integrated 
bundle of bilateral treaties. 
 
This goes to the core of the problem as it allows OFC states to make a number of important 
modifications using bilateral conventions. The OFC states have been brought into the 
negotiations and in doing so have succeeded in changing a number of OECD requirements 
on a state-by-state basis, providing precedence for other states to follow suit. For example, 
in its June 2004 Global Forum on Taxation, which brings OFC states and the OECD 
together, St Vincent and the Grenadines successfully pushed through two proposals. The 
first was that the imposition of defensive measures be suspended until a level playing field 
was achieved. The second was that the discourse of OECD policy was changed. The 
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requirement that countries ‘should’ exchange information by 2006 has been replaced. They 
are now ‘encouraged’ to exchange information by that date. St Vincent and the Grenadines 
interpreted this by deciding not to exchange information by 2006 until the issue of a level 
playing field was resolved (Lomas, 2004). The MOU commitments signed by 30 out of the 
35 OFC states have been substantially modified by these negotiations. This reflects the 
difficulty of encouraging meta-regulatory principles within a global system of bilateral tax 
treaties that use OFC states.  
 
Meta principles 
 
International initiatives aimed at ending harmful tax practices effectively transfer 
regulatory oversight to OFC states. Offshore finance designed to minimise taxes involve 
volatile risks. As discussed above, it is a misnomer to suggest that OFC states are 
completely unregulated spaces. Rather, their regulatory frameworks are established in an 
asymmetrical relationship with onshore regulations (Palan, 1999). By establishing best 
practice principles these regulatory standards are enhanced and given increased credibility. 
OFC states that can not implement these principles face crisis and in some cases (for 
instance Tonga) have closed down. However, this is by no means a predicament for all 
OFC states. OECD, IMF and EU initiatives involve meta-regulation. Braithwaite (2003,   
p. 1) defines meta-regulation as the ‘risk management of risk management’ The IMF sees 
OFC states as potentially destabilising markets and they must be strengthened in order to 
minimise this risk. Tax administrators in OECD and the EU see them as risks to the 
integrity of national revenue collection systems. These two risks are not identical, and, in 
the arbitrage between the two, OFC states reposition themselves as viable entrepots. 
Multilateral organisations and supranational institutions invest self-regulatory capacities in 
the OFC states. Tax havens thus regulate themselves with organisations such as the OECD 
and IMF having broad monitoring functions.  
 
As Braithwaite (2003, p. 3) notes meta-regulation involves ‘shaping the risk management 
systems of other organisations in the taxpaying environment’. For the OECD this means 
that OFC authorities must provide a regulatory framework for fund management 
companies, banks, insurers, trustees and stock exchanges that is transparent. They must 
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enforce rules for Due Diligence that establish the true identity of their clients. Know Your 
Customer (KYC) rules need to be implemented. Offshore financial provider firms must 
demonstrate that they can identify the beneficial owners of the entities that they manage. 
Meta regulation involves reflexivity, consultation, dialogue, and a responsive appreciation 
of industry sector. This transfers trust and accountability to local offshore states. For 
example, as one regulator observed, they used focus on money transfers to and from the 
Netherlands Antilles. Now that the Netherlands Antilles have committed to the OECD’s 
Harmful Tax Initiative, that ‘jurisdiction is not so much of a problem’ (Interview, Sydney, 
August 2002). It does not follow however, that the Netherlands Antilles can no longer offer 
attractive tax concessions to transnational citizens.  
 
Strategies of regulatory devolution are most successful when the meta regulator has the 
capacity to escalate ‘interventions of ever-increasing intrusiveness’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992, p. 6; see also Braithwaite, 2003, p. 13). Braithwaite (2003, p. 14) shows that in their 
monitoring competencies, meta-regulators scan for risks and move to those areas of highest 
risk. However, when dealing with OFC states this option is problematic because they are 
protected by the barrier of sovereignty and the option of bilateralism. These international 
initiatives have brought small OFC states into a fiscal conversation and in this dialogue the 
Caribbean nation of St Vincent and the Grenadines has won important concessions from an 
organisation representing some of the powerful nations on earth. Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000, p. 7) affirm that ‘Through devising and proliferating alternative models of 
regulation, the weak create opportunities for themselves to change existing regulatory 
orders’. However, this sometimes has unintended consequences. 
 
Fiscal bilateralism and the global market for double taxation agreements 
 
Weak states are particularly adept at developing their own alternative regulatory models 
when they build into a pre-existing system (Duursma, 1996). Globally taxation has been 
the preserve of the nation state, emblematic of national sovereignty (Braithwaite & Drahos, 
2000, p. 89; Picciotto, 1999, p. 70). Braithwaite & Drahos (2000, p. 89) show that the 
national system of separate taxation systems has ‘cost states dearly’. Yet multinational 
corporations and High Wealth Individuals (HWIs) are not constrained by sovereignty. 
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Contrasts in national tax regimes, sustained by the intersection of state sovereignty, 
generate opportunities for tax minimisation on a massive scale. In 1998 a British 
Parliamentary report estimated that over US$6 trillion is kept offshore (Edwards, 1998,    
p. 4). Approximately US$800 billion alone is domiciled in the Cayman Islands (US$20 
million per island resident) (Sikka, 2003, p. 367). Between US$3 and US$4 trillion of HWI 
(High Wealth Individual) savings are believed to be domiciled in tax havens (Oxfam, 
2000, p. 3). In 2000 the IMF estimated that there was a US$1.7 trillion discrepancy 
between reported portfolio assets and liabilities caused by channelling funds through OFCs 
(IMF, 2000). In 2001 the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that it loses US$70 
billion per annum due to tax haven activity (IRS, 2001, p. 1). In a study of tax return data 
from 235 HWIs, Braithwaite, Pittelkow and Williams (2003) found that the use of offshore 
entities in a jurisdiction that may be a tax haven is a significant risk factor in aggressive tax 
planning strategies.  
 
These OFC states exist at the ‘interface’ of world wide tax regimes (Hampton, 1996). 
They, in fact, take advantage of the bilateral system of Double Taxation Treaties, or 
Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) concluded between states. There are now some 1000 
DTAs between states (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 106). They were designed as a way 
of giving relief to companies for foreign source income to ensure that they would not be 
taxed twice. While commendable in some respects, the bilateral system of DTAs is fraught 
with dilemmas for national authorities, and rich with opportunities for transnational 
citizens.  
 
As tax regulation was never internationalised by way of a multilateral agreement, but 
rather dichotomised between states in an ever increasing number of DTAs, multinationals 
could take advantage of diversity in types, rates and definitions of tax. Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000, p. 94) note that one consequence of this was that ‘Poorly designed and 
enforced double tax treaties often meant that tax was paid in neither state’. OECD states 
responded by introducing ever more complex legislation, such as Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC) rules, which simply exacerbated the problem for them and created 
more opportunities for multinationals and HWIs to engage in arbitrage and reduce their tax 
liabilities (Burns, 1992; OECD, 1996; Inglis, 2002). One interviewee explained it by 
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saying ‘In Singapore you have gift and estate tax, but in the US you only have estate tax, 
and there, there you have it; the difference in between the two immediately creates 
opportunities for tax planning’ (Interview, Singapore, February 2004). In Andorra, 
accountants interviewed specialised in using DTAs. All transactions had to be declared to a 
client’s home revenue authority. DTAs could then be invoked to reduce tax liabilities in 
one’s home country from 35 percent to five percent (Interview, Andorra La Vella, 
December 2003).  
 
Between 2002 and 2004, these multilateral initiatives have unfolded in such a way as to 
encourage bilateralism rather than multilateralism. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000,       
p. 109) affirm ‘Mutual Assistance and information exchange have followed the same 
pathways laid down by bilateral treaties’. These bilateral treaties have conferred more meta 
regulatory independence to tax haven service authorities, while renouncing the capacity for 
enforcement that regulators of self-regulation require, precisely because their own 
members do not abide by the same standards being asked of the OFC states. This allows 
OFC states to build upon a key resource that has been deployed in attracting HWI and 
multinational clients for the past half century: political stability and its accompanying 
‘good reputations’.  
 
Compliance and sovereignty 
 
Through complying with these initiatives OFC states reinscribe their reputation and 
political soundness in the eyes of investors, and they remain jurisdictions characterised by 
‘good governance’ meeting the highest international standards and continue to be ideal 
locales for structuring transnational business ventures. Thus these multilateral initiatives, in 
creating the possibilities for bilateralism may have the reverse effect of what they 
originally intended: through allowing OFCs to demonstrate their good governance to the 
world they maintain their client base and sustain an on-going fiscal competition between 
states for tax revenues. The preservation of fiscal sovereignty and a redefinition of 
reputation and governance enhances the viability of key OFCs. These initiatives reinforce 
the sovereign, because they demonstrate that their systems are robust and well-regulated. 
MOU declarations followed by the more discrete, confidential and private negotiations 
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involved in drafting bilateral exchange of information treaties end up legitimising many of 
the key features that make OFC states so attractive to transnational business and HWIs.  
 
These international initiatives actually strengthen the position of many of these states 
because they allow them to play upon their own constitutional ambiguity. For example, the 
capacity to conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties is usually confined to fully 
independent states. In the case of Guernsey, the United Kingdom would normally sign 
treaties on behalf of the island. In February 2003 however, Guernsey (together with the Isle 
of Man and Jersey) signed a bilateral tax information exchange agreement with the United 
States. While 60 percent of respondents on Guernsey reported that these initiatives, leading 
to greater participation in bilateral exchange of information agreements, were having an 
impact on their firms, not one said that they were affecting the long-term viability of their 
business or the offshore sector. The most noticeable effect was increased compliance costs 
associated with due diligence checks, an increased number of mergers and acquisitions and 
a consolidation of the very wealthy end of the market. One trustee said that these initiatives 
are ‘going to be good for Guernsey’, because they are proving that small trust companies 
can compete and retain clients, while enabling them to diversify into the HWI market 
(Interview, Guernsey, 30 January 2004). Another said these initiatives allow OECD and 
EU countries: 
 
… to strike up bilateral relationships with smaller territories. The EU Savings Tax 
Directive allows us to have treaties of information exchange with the EU members 
proving that the island can deal internationally. The EC can make prejudicial 
rulings that disadvantage members in their international relationships, for example a 
tax agreement between Dublin or Luxembourg and Brazil. This does not apply to 
the Channel Islands. We can deal directly with Brazil if we want to. The more 
bilateral relationships we have the better. They also provide a contribution as to 
how one should regulate to the best standards internationally. This is good for 
Guernsey (Interview, January 2004).  
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Conclusion 
 
When these initiatives were first announced scholars argued that the offshore faced a 
significant threat of erosion (Hampton & Christensen, 2002, p. 1667). This assessment is 
salient as a number of states have abolished their offshore facilities, reduced the number of 
offshore financial products or experienced a serious loss of business to the point where 
their continued viability is doubtful. Reports from some Caribbean OFC states indicate that 
the compliance costs of enhanced due diligence now exceed government earnings from 
hosting an offshore facility. Yet other OFC states continue to prosper, particularly 
Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, Bermuda, the BVI and the Cayman Islands, alongside 
unlisted centres of international private banking such as Singapore.  
 
Through complying with the OECD, the EU and the IMF, Guernsey and other jurisdictions 
enhance their own positions in the international community. They reinscribe their 
reputations as ideal centres from which to base and trade highly mobile financial capital. 
Meta-regulation is encouraged by placing trust in the self-regulatory capacities of offshore 
financial service authorities, while following a pre-existing bilateral model. Their 
behaviour, as Palan (2003) suggests, is a response to the contemporary fusion of modern 
capitalism and the paradoxes of international relations. Important changes are taking place 
however. Due diligence and KYC procedures mean that transparency has been improved. 
It is not completely unforeseeable that OECD revenue departments will not be able to 
exchange information with OFC states on tax matters. Secrecy can no longer be used as a 
sacrosanct veil concealing complex tax planning strategies. However, secrecy and 
transparency may not be necessary in a fiscal world of competing national bilateralisms on 
the one side, and global business transactions that dissolve national borders on the other. 
Through preserving a system based on two contradictory trends – sovereignty and fiscal 
mobility – national governments may increasingly lose control of their ability to tax 
multinational profits. What may be needed is not a continued reliance on bilateral treaties, 
but a truly multilateral approach that goes beyond a reliance on shaky MOUs and the 
assurances of good corporate governance offshore. Only then will the onshore regulators of 
offshore regulators be able to devise a truly meta format that brings the taxes in for all to 
fairly partake.  
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